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Abstract 
 
The paper assembles data on over 1,000 manufacturing and services firms in India for the 
entire post-reform period from 1992 through 2002 to examine the association between 
corporate governance and monetary policy. The findings suggests that (a) public firms 
are relatively more responsive to a monetary contraction vis-à-vis their private 
counterparts; and, (b) quoted firms lower their long-term bank borrowings in favour of 
short-term borrowings, post monetary tightening, as compared with unquoted firms. A 
disaggregated analysis based on firm size and leverage above a certain threshold validates 
these findings. The study concludes by analyzing the broad policy implications of these 
findings. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 Two main competing paradigms dominate the literature on corporate financial 
structures. The first strand of thinking argues that there is an optimal financial structure in 
every firm that depends on various attributes of the firm. According to this view, the firm 
is seen as choosing its financial structure by minimizing its overall cost of capital, which 
is a weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The second approach to financial structure choice by firms postulates that firms 
establish a hierarchy of preferences towards sources of funds in that they first fully utilise 
all available internal resources and only in case their financing needs are not satisfied 
through this route, they approach the market for external sources (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Even in this case, they prefer to raise money through debt, which does not suffer 
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from asymmetric information problems and only if they cannot meet their remaining 
requirement through this source, they access the equity route for resource augmentation. 
Although information asymmetry lies at the core of the Myers-Majluf argument, 
it is easily to discern reasons as to why firms might have the same type of lexicographic 
preference towards sources of finance. The most obvious is that of control and the threat 
of takeover that equity carries with it. Others relate to the fact that firms might not be 
keen to reveal their investment plans to public financiers and consequently, prefer to be 
financed by private capital (such as bank loans). Another possibility might be simply the 
fact that firms are too small to credibly signal quality of their investment project to 
private financiers, and as a result, rely on banks for supplementing their capital base.  
 On the other hand, recent insights in monetary theory have underscored the fact 
that it is important to analyze the differences in impact of monetary policy on various 
types and classes of firms. The first line of thinking, the credit view (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995) observes that bank-dependent firms are more likely to be affected by a 
monetary contraction than firms that rely less on bank financing and more on capital 
markets. Public firms will be able to adjust their debt positions, e.g., decrease their 
leverage by issuing equity, while private firms cannot do so if they face higher 
informational costs. As a consequence, private firms will face higher user cost of capital 
and probably make lower investment. The second view, the relationship lending view, 
predicts that higher costs of borrowing will induce public firms to adjust their loan 
portfolio more than private firms. This view opines that bank-dependent firms are more 
likely to accept higher costs of bank borrowing, because they will benefit from the 
relationship with the bank. 
A third strand of the literature concerns corporate governance. There are four 
paradigms on corporate governance. The first, direct control via debt, implies 
relationship banking: companies have exclusive financing relationships with a small 
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number of creditors and equity holders. The second, market control via equity, implies 
that firms that deviate most extensively from shareholders objectives, and consequently 
tend to have lower market value as shareholders dispose of their holdings, have a greater 
likelihood of being acquired. The third, market control via equity, implies aligning the 
equity stakes of managers in LBOs with those of equity holders. The fourth is the direct 
control via equity wherein pressure is exerted via direct links from institutional investors 
to management, either formally through annual meetings or informally at other times.  
The present paper combines these three strands of literature. In other words, it 
juxtaposes these viewpoints and investigates the association among corporate finance, 
corporate governance and monetary policy in India against the backdrop of a decade of 
economic reforms. Therefore, the line of research pursued in this paper is the interlinkage 
of the relationships among corporate finance, corporate governance and monetary policy. 
Empirical research in this area has, however, been largely confined to developed 
economies like United States (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996; Kashyap et al., 1993, 1996) 
and to a limited extent, the EU economies (de Haan and Sterken, 2000) with very limited 
research being forthcoming in this area in the context of developing countries. One can 
cite two major reasons for the same. First, until recently, the corporate sector in many 
developing markets encountered several constraints on their choices regarding sources of 
funds with rigorous constraints in accessing equity markets. As a consequence, any 
research on the capital structure and corporate governance features of firms could have 
been largely constraint-driven and hence less illuminating. Second, several developing 
countries, even till the late 1980s, suffered from ‘financial repression’, with negative real 
rates on savings and investment as well high levels of statutory pre-emptions and 
administered rates on lending and deposits. This could have meant restricted play of 
competitive forces in resource allocation and limited maneuverability of the central bank 
in the conduct of monetary policy.  
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 However, questions regarding the interface between corporate governance and 
monetary policy have gained prominence in recent years, especially in the context of the 
fast changing institutional framework in these countries. Several developing countries 
have introduced market-oriented reforms in the financial sector. More importantly, the 
institutional set-up within which firms operated in the regulated era has undergone 
substantial transformation since the late 1980s. The move towards market-driven 
allocation of resources, coupled with the widening and deepening of financial markets, 
including the capital market, and the stringent disclosure and transparency practices 
consequent upon initial public offerings has provided the scope for corporates to 
determine their own capital choice and introduce better corporate governance practices.  
The paper attempts to examine the association among corporate governance and 
monetary policy in India using firm-level data. The corporate sector in the country is 
characterised by a large number of firms, in both the public and private sectors, operating 
in a deregulated and increasingly competitive environment. The rigorous listing criteria 
for corporate houses have meant that they have to enforce strict corporate governance 
practices, akin to direct control via equity. At the same time, the monopoly of 
development banks in the provision of long-term debt finance has also diminished with 
banks being allowed to provide long-term capital to corporates. This has provided greater 
option to corporates to choose their capital structure. In the financial sector, the 
deregulation of the administered interest rate structure, lowering of statutory pre-
emptions and the introduction of an auction system for Government paper has imparted 
greater flexibility to the central bank in its conduct of monetary policy. The changing 
institutional environment for corporates coupled with the increasing freedom of the 
central bank in monetary policy formulation provides a suitable background for testing 
the linkage among these issues. It however needs to be recognised that there remains the 
question of the role of equity-related corporate governance mechanisms. However, the 
 4
empirical analysis does not incorporate the finer details on ownership structure or 
features of internal corporate governance mechanisms and has, therefore, not been 
addressed in the present study.  
Apart from attempting to be the first research paper to examine this issue in the 
Indian context, the major contributions of the paper is three-fold: first, the firm-level 
dataset employed in the study for the post-liberalisation period provides a more 
illuminating evidence on capital choices by firms and to what extent is the same impacted 
by a monetary policy shock. Secondly, the study distinguishes firms with different 
corporate governance features in analysing the impact of monetary policy shocks. And 
finally, the study examines the differential response to monetary policy for manufacturing 
firms as compared to those in services. 
The broad findings can be summarized as follows. First, public firms in India are 
found to be more responsive to a monetary contraction vis-à-vis their private 
counterparts. Second, as compared with unquoted firms, quoted firms lower their long-
term bank borrowings in favour of short-term borrowings, post monetary tightening. 
Finally, manufacturing firms are found to be relatively more responsive to monetary 
shock than services firms. A disaggregated analysis based on firm size and leverage 
above a certain threshold indicates that the above results are equally valid in the case of 
large firms, as well as firms, with varying degrees of leveraging. 
The rest of the paper proceeds along the following lines. The next section 
develops a theoretical model of relationship lending. The central feature of the model is 
the differential response of public and private firms consequent upon a change in the 
policy interest rate. We make a clear distinction between public and private firms, since 
the subsequent analysis explicitly distinguishes these two classes of firms. Section 3 
provides an overview of the received literature and explains the position of this paper in 
the field. The database employed in the study is detailed in Section 4. Section 5 describes 
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the basic hypothesis to be tested and specifies the empirical model and the methodology 
adopted for the study. The main findings and a discussion of the results are contained in 
Section 6. The ultimate section highlights the policy implications of the findings and 
syncopates the concluding remarks. 
  
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Assume that any firm (either public or private) employs both bank and non-bank 
capital. The main corporate governance difference between public and private firms is 
that the latter are able to acquire capital from an inner circle of financiers that often have 
a special connection with the firm, while the former obtain funds externally from a 
widely scattered group of investors that does not seek a special relation with the firm. 
Consequently, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that public firms will have 
greater incentive to reveal more information about the company to financiers (such as 
banks) than private firms. Therefore, the former are able to pay lower interest rates on 
loans than the latter. The reverse side of the process is that banks do not have the 
opportunity to collect greater information on public firms than the average financier, and 
consequently, cannot use this information to extract possible future profits. In that case, 
banks will make less investment in acquiring firm-specific information on public firms. 
As a result, public firms are likely to benefit less than private firms from banking 
relationships in terms of a higher probability of success in carrying out the investment 
project. Therefore, while public firms will possibly pay a lower lending rate, it will 
probably not be able to internalise the additional benefits of a relationship loan. This view 
has implications for the impact of monetary policy on bank borrowing by firms. If 
monetary policy is tightened so that banks face higher funding costs and are forced to 
increase lending rate, public firms are likely to be the first to switch over to the relatively 
cheaper non-bank financing. In contrast, privately owned firms, benefiting from bank 
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relationships and having less access to non-bank forms of finance, will stick longer to 
bank loan financing.  
 It is assumed that each firm is a collection of investment projects. Each project 
requires an investment of I. If the project is successful, it yields an output Y>0 with 
probability θ and Y=0 with probability (1-θ). Firms pay a premium of δi (i=public or 
private) on top of the floor lending rate which is assumed to be R. This premium is the 
compensation for the services of banks offered to the firms. Since information gathering 
on private firms is more costly vis-à-vis public firm, the premium will be set higher for 
private firms relative to public firms. During the term of the contract, the interest rate on 
loans might decrease (Berger and Udell, 1995) or increase (Kaplan and Minton, 1994), 
which banks pass on to firms through changes in the base lending rate. It is assumed that 
the banking market is perfectly competitive. In other words, there exists perfect 
competition in supplying loans to public and private firms separately.  
 The primary focus of the model is on the sensitivity of the demand for bank loans 
to changes in interest rates. Towards this end, expected profits for various firm projects 
have been modeled. The expected profits of firm i [i.e., E(PFi )] from a bank-financed 
project are: 
)]1([][ i
F
i RYPE δθ ++−=                                                                                                   (1) 
Likewise, the expected profits of bank i [i.e., E(PBi )]can be expressed as 
1)1(][ −++= iBi RPE δθ                                                                                                    (2) 
Assuming perfect competition (hence, E[PBi=0]), it follows that: 
1)1( −++= iR δθ                                                                                                                    (3) 
 The above equation illustrates that, in equilibrium, the benefits firms enjoy from 
bank relationships are inversely related to the interest rate premium paid. Substituting this 
expression into the equation of expected firm profits (1) yields expression (4). i.e, : 
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1]1)][1([][ −++++−= iiFB RRYPE δδ                                                                             (4) 
This leads to the basic proposition: 
Proposition: Bank financed projects of private firms are less sensitive to monetary policy 
shocks than bank financed projects of public firms. 
 
Proof: The proof of the proposition is straightforward. Note that, the partial 
derivative of expected firm profits consequent upon a change in interest rate is given by 
equation (5): 
0)1/(/][ 2 <++−=∂∂ iFi RYRPE δ                                                                                 (5) 
Since the premium (δ) of a privately-owned firm is higher than that for publicly-
owned firm, equation (5) reveals that the elasticity of the profitability of bank-financed 
projects of the private firm is smaller in absolute value than that of the public firm. 
The intuition behind this result can be stated as follows. A rise in interest rate 
changes the composition of projects towards high-risk ones and to that extent lowers 
expected firm profitability. Since the premium δ is higher for private vis-à-vis public 
firms, this would imply that the decline in expected profits for private firms is higher as 
compared with public firms. 
 
3. RECEIVED LITERATURE 
 Academic interest in monetary issues has devoted significant attention to the 
different transmission channels of monetary policy. The credit channel of monetary 
policy advocates the twin channels: balance sheet channel and the bank-lending channel 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The former channel concentrates on the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the strength of the firm’s balance sheet, making the firm less 
or more collateralised when seeking external funds, The latter channel, on the other hand, 
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focuses on the monetary policy impact on the credit supply which filters through into the 
external financing premium for firms (and households).  
 The literature on monetary transmission has expanded rapidly in recent years. 
Empirical studies on this aspect can be split into several categories. The first class of 
models is essentially microeconomic in nature. These models seek to analyze the impact 
of monetary innovations in Vector Auto Regression (VAR) models (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992). These studies are couched on the notion that banks actively reshuffle their 
portfolio of assets following a change in the stance of monetary policy. The second class 
of studies analyzes firm-level investment behaviour. More particularly, the focus of these 
studies is to ascertain the effect of financial constraints on investment (Fazzari et al., 
1988). The general conclusion of this strand of literature is that small firms are typically 
more liquidity constrained. A third line of thinking analyzes bank behaviour in response 
to monetary shocks. It is likely that smaller banks, like firms, have more trouble in 
attracting external funds in case of a monetary contraction (Kashyap and Stein, 1997). 
The final strand of research analyzes the corporate financial structure along changes in 
monetary regimes. These studies have focused on the US economy (Kashyap et al., 1993; 
Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). Kashyap et al. (1993) empirically examine the existence of 
a loan supply  (or a bank lending) channel of monetary policy transmission for the U.S. 
economy using quarterly data for the period 1963-89. Their findings suggest that tighter 
monetary policy tends to induce firms' to employ a convex combination of external 
finance wherein the issuance of commercial paper rises, while that of bank loans fall. The 
net effect is an overall decline in loan supply. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), on the other 
hand, investigate changes in the investment behavior of small and large manufacturing 
firms consequent upon a change in monetary policy. In contrast to the Kashyap et al. 
(1993) study which employs aggregate data, the latter employ quarterly data on 
manufacturing firms covering the period 1962:1 to 1992:4 and arrive at the conclusion 
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that monetary tightening has differential effect on small vis-à-vis large firms. 
Specifically, for small firms, it was an observed tightening of the association between 
internal funds and investment after a monetary contraction. In contrast, no such 
association was in evidence for large firms. This would suggest a scarcity of external 
finance (broad credit channel) after a monetary tightening for small firms.  
The present paper belongs to this last genre of thinking. In particular, the paper 
analyzes the impact of monetary policy on capital structure of firms with different 
corporate governance characteristics. With respect to corporate governance structure, 
international evidence has highlighted significant differences across the world (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). The choice of the corporate financial structure is dependent on the 
opinions with respect to governance of the suppliers of capital. This leads to the 
viewpoint that changes in monetary policy might have differential effect on firms in 
bank-based economies vis-à-vis market-based systems. However, studies correlating 
corporate financial structure with changes in monetary policy have been limited. In one 
of the earliest studies, Dedola and Lippi (2000) analyze four European countries and the 
US. They estimate the elasticities of output with respect to monetary policy indicators for 
various industries and employ firm-level indicators to explain the magnitude of these 
elasticities. The findings indicate that financial structure is important at the industry level: 
industries that have a greater concentration of small firms or firms with a lower leverage 
or industries that are more capital intensive are more likely to be significantly impacted 
by a monetary contraction. Industries that have relatively many firms in financial distress 
(measured by a large interest burden) are also more sensitive to monetary policy shocks. 
Using business survey data, findings for Germany have uncovered the evidence that 
smaller firms are more affected by monetary shocks than large firms (Ehrmann, 2000). 
In the Indian context, there have been several studies on the analytics of 
monetary policy (Rangarajan, 1988; Reddy, 2002), on the financing pattern of corporate 
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houses (Cobham and Subramanium, 1995) as well as the role of large shareholders in 
corporate governance (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000) and the differential corporate governance 
pattern in public versus private banks (Jalan, 2002). However, research analyzing the 
interface between corporate finance, corporate governance and monetary policy has not 
been adequately addressed. The present paper attempts to address this shortcoming in the 
Indian context. 
4. THE DATABASE 
 The database employed in the study is the publicly available Prowess database, 
generated and maintained by CMIE, the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The 
database is broadly akin to the Compustat database of US firms and is increasingly 
employed in the literature for firm-level analysis on Indian industry for analysis of issues 
like the effect of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms (Chibber and 
Majumdar, 1999), performance of firms affiliated to diversified business groups (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000) and the role of large shareholders in corporate governance (Sarkar and 
Sarkar, 2000). The dataset contains financial information on around 8,000 companies, 
which are either listed (on either the Stock Exchange, Mumbai or the National Stock 
Exchange) as well as major unlisted public limited companies having sales exceeding 
Rs.10 million. In addition, an entity qualifies for inclusion in the database if the average 
sum of sales and total assets is more than or equal to Rs.200 million for the latest audited 
financial results and the entity is not listed.2 There is detailed information on the financial 
performance of these companies culled out from their profit and loss accounts, balance 
sheets and stock price data. The database also contains background information, 
including ownership pattern, product profile, plant location and new investment projects 
for these companies. 
                                                 
2 USD 1 ≈ Rs.45 
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The selection of the sample is guided by the availability of data. From the entire 
database, all the firms which maintained its identity and reported its annual accounts 
without any gaps for the entire sample period, viz., 1992 through 2002 have been 
selected. This has been done with a view to take into consideration all firms, whether 
listed or otherwise, since the inception of reforms in 1992 and in existence over the entire 
sample period. Screening for data consistency3 on the basis of this criterion led to the 
selection of a sample of 1,096 firms comprising public and private, belonging to both 
manufacturing and services sectors.4  
 A word is in order as regards the choice of the sample period. Until 1992, the 
corporate sector in India faced several constraints on its choices regarding sources of 
funds. Access to the equity market was regulated by the Controller of Capital Issues 
(CCI), an agency under the Government, which imposed stringent restrictions on 
corporate houses intending to raise funds through the equity route. Long-term debt was 
largely under the purview of state-owned development banks, which, either through 
direct lending or through refinancing arrangements, virtually monopolised the supply of 
debt finance to the corporate sector.  
In the financial sector likewise, till the initiation of reforms in 1991, financial 
institutions had heavy restrictions on application of funds. In July 1991, for instance, 
commercial banks had to hold in cash reserves and government debt instruments as much 
as 63.5 per cent of increases in deposits. In addition, they had to extend 40 per cent of 
their credit to priority sectors such as agriculture, small-scale industries and housing with 
sub-targets for each at subsidized rates differentiated by purpose, size of loan and 
borrower (there were 50 such rates in 1989). Even the free portion of banks’ resources 
was subject to ‘credit norms’, which set inflexible limits to loans according to sector, 
                                                 
3Firms that underwent merger/acquisition during this period were dropped from the 
sample. 
4Banking firms, given their high degree of leveraging, were excluded from the sample. 
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purpose and security.  The Government also regulated the use of financial instruments as 
well as interest rates on loans and deposits; lending rates were fixed for both priority and 
non-priority sectors.  
In 1992, as part of the sweeping set of reforms relating to the equity market, the 
CCI was abolished and corporate houses have been given the freedom to access capital 
markets and price their securities, subject to prudential regulations of the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the regulator of stock markets. Furthermore, Indian 
firms in sound financial condition have been allowed to issue equity and convertible 
bonds abroad. Likewise, as regards raising resources domestically through debt capital, 
institutional reforms have been aimed at curtailing the monopoly in supply of long-term 
funds by development banks, with banks being also permitted to extend long-term 
financing.  
In the financial sector, the administered interest rate structure of banks has been 
rationalised. The prescriptions of rates on all term deposits, including conditions of 
premature withdrawal and offering uniform rate, irrespective of the size of deposits, have 
been dispensed with. On the lending side, lending rates have been deregulated. Likewise, 
the Bank Rate (the rate at which the central bank refinances commercial banks), after 
being dormant for several decades, has been activated as a signalling rate and 
simultaneously, the statutory pre-emptions on bank deposits have been gradually 
lowered, providing them with greater freedom in credit allocation. The removal of these 
twin restrictions meant that a greater role of the price mechanism (interest rate) in the 
resource allocation process and allowing corporates to freely raise resources from 
domestic capital markets, enabling a greater role of the corporate governance mechanism 
in company affairs.  
Table 1 gives the representation of the sample. In addition, it also provides the 
number of firms by governance type. About 10.2 per cent of the companies in the sample 
 13
are public and the remaining are private firms. Within this broad categorization, 74 per 
cent of the public firms are in manufacturing and the remaining belongs to services. As 
regards private firms, nearly 89 per cent are in manufacturing, with 11 per cent being in 
services. Listed firms comprise around 63 per cent of the private firms. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In terms of the main governance features, the minimum paid up equity capital of 
the firm in order to be listed should not be less than Rs. 100 million, whereas post-issue, 
the capitalization of the company should not be lower than Rs. 250 million, irrespective 
of the type of ownership. In addition, the applicant needs to satisfy certain minimum 
criteria as laid down in the SEBI Act, 1992 and Companies Act, 19565. In addition, the 
company needs to provide certain critical information regarding its distribution of share 
holding, details of pending litigation and grievance redressal mechanism, besides 
submitting its audited balance sheet of three preceding years prior to year of listing. In 
addition, shareholders have the right to select members on the boards of directors and 
pressure is exerted from institutional investors to management through annual meetings.  
The basic features of the sample firms and their financing pattern over the period 
of study are summarized in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Private firms, on an average, are larger than their public counterparts. Regarding 
the source of financing, it is observed that bank debt has been the predominant source of 
financing for public firms including quoted ones, whereas the situation obtaining has 
been markedly different for private firms, for whom reliance on bank financing was 
comparatively lower. This was more evident in the case of quoted private firms. 
However, private firms had a significant focus on working capital, although its overall 
                                                 
5Companies Act, 1956 provides a set of rules and regulations for registration of 
companies, irrespective of whether they are public limited or private limited companies. 
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short-term bank debt was more than a third lower as compared with public firms. On the 
uses side, it was clear that public firms tended to hold larger inventories vis-à-vis private 
ones: quoted private firms had the lowest inventory holding over this period. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 The main interest of the study concerns the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
the financing behaviour of firms and its dependence on corporate governance 
characteristics. Concerning the capital structure, the study focuses on four debt ratios: 
(a) total debt to total assets (DEBT), 
(b) bank debt to total assets (BKDEBT) as the main focus is on the special role of bank 
debt; 
(c) long-term bank loans to total assets (LTBANK), 
(d) short-term bank debt to total assets (STBANK), in order to distinguish between the 
differential maturity profile of short and long-term bank loans; 
In addition to the above four ratios, following Peterson and Rajan (1997), the 
study considers the ratio of trade credit to total assets (TRADE). This variable has 
received a lot of attention in the literature for its substitutability with bank debt in general 
and, more specifically, in relation to monetary contraction. 
Following previous research in this area (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996), the estimated 
equation is assumed to have the following reduced form: 
itittitit eGOVMPIMPIXY +++= *γβα                                                          (6) 
where i=1,2,…,1096 (number of firms) and t=1,2,…,11 (number of years). The panel 
is balanced, so that one is left with equal number of firms in each year.  
In the aforesaid specification, Yit denotes one of the aforementioned debt ratios of 
firm i in year t, Xit are a vector of control variables, explaining the capital structure 
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choices of firms; MPI is the monetary policy indicator at time t and GOV is a dummy 
variable for the governance type of firm.  
More specifically, there are two sets of dummy variables. The first dummy 
(PUBLIC), takes the value 1 for public firms and 0, otherwise. The second dummy 
variable, labeled QUOTED, is 1 if the firm (public or private) is quoted on the stock 
exchange and 0, otherwise. In other words, PUBLIC focuses on the ownership features, 
while QUOTED captures the governance characteristics of firms. Finally, eit denotes the 
error component. 
The vector of variables X is included to control for idiosynchratic effects on 
firm’s capital structure. These are explanatory variables which are commonly employed 
in the literature to explain debt ratios, viz., interest expenses (INT), tangible assets 
(TAN), intangible assets (INTANG), firm size (SIZE), depreciation (DEPCN) and 
earnings before interest and taxes (EARN). All these variables are expressed as ratios to 
total assets, except SIZE, which is the natural logarithm of total assets itself. The direct 
effect of monetary policy on the firm’s capital structure is captured by the coefficient β, 
whereas the differential effects of monetary policy for particular governance type of firms 
are captured byγ . The interaction of the monetary policy variable with the two sets of 
dummy variables intends to ascertain whether monetary policy has differential effects on 
public versus private firms and quoted versus unquoted firms. Fully specified, equation 
(6) can be re-written as: 
ititit
tititititititit
eQUOTEDMPIPUBLICMPI
MPIEARNDEPCNSIZEINTANGTANINTY
+++
++++++=
** 21
654321
γγ
βαααααα  (7) 
The priors with respect to the expected signs of the coefficients of the control 
variables can be stated as follows: 
INT is the ratio of interest payments to total assets. Firms that have high interest 
expenses provide a signal to the market of possible financial distress. Alternately, high 
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interest expense could imply the presence of a large debt tax shield. Both interpretations 
lead to the expectation of a negative coefficient of interest expenses. Hence, the sign of 
the coefficient α1 is a priori expected to be negative. 
TAN is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Tangibility of assets is measured as 
the sum of property, plant and equipments of the firm (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
Firms with relatively few tangible assets are likely to be more opaque to the markets (i.e., 
have greater informational asymmetry problems) than firms with more tangible (hence 
collateralizable) assets. Firms with low proportion of tangible assets should, therefore, 
have more difficulty obtaining external finance. This would imply a positive sign on α2. 
INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. A high proportion of 
intangible assets denote lower collateral value and hence the coefficient α3 is expected to 
be negative. Intangible investments are also considered a proxy for high growth 
opportunities for the firm. High growth options should, according to agency theory, 
negatively influence the use of debt, and hence, would imply a negative sign for this 
coefficient.  
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Large firms tend to be well-
diversified and better known to outside investors, so that they have fewer asymmetric 
information problems on the capital market and run lower business risks. Therefore, SIZE 
is expected to be positively related to the use of debt, i.e, the coefficient α4 would be 
positive.  
DEPCN is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. A high depreciation implies the 
presence of a large non-debt tax shield, making the use of debt tax shields relatively 
redundant. This would suggest a negative sign on α5.  
EARN is the ratio of earnings before tax to total assets. The ‘pecking order’ theory of 
finance predicts that firms prefer internal finance over external finance, including debt. 
High earnings enable firms to finance their investments largely with retained earnings, so 
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that substantial debt finance is not necessary. Hence, the coefficient α6 is expected to be 
negative.  
The priors with respect to the monetary policy indicator and its governance 
interaction terms are as follows: 
The traditional view on monetary transmission focuses on the interest rate 
channel. A monetary policy-induced rise in the short-term interest rate reduces both 
interest sensitive investment spending and the corporate demand for bank debt. However, 
the interest rate channel can have different implications for debt of differing maturity. It 
is probable that short-term debt will be reduced after a monetary policy-induced rise in 
short-term interest rate, but it is not so clear for long-term debt. The credit view of 
monetary transmission puts on stage the broad credit channel, comprising of the credit 
channel and the lending channel. These channels enhance the negative effects of 
monetary policy tightening. According to the lending channel theory, monetary policy 
tightening constrains the supply of bank credit, which exerts an additional negative effect 
for bank-dependent firms. This would suggest a negative coefficient for the monetary 
policy indicator, β, especially for short-term loans. For long-term loans, the expected sign 
on this coefficient is ambiguous. 
The interaction term of the monetary policy indicator with the public firm 
dummy has been included to capture the possibility as to how public firms adjust their 
capital structure consequent upon a monetary policy shock. Public firms, being better 
known to outside investors vis-à-vis their private counterparts, are less prone to 
asymmetric information problems and consequently, have easier access to capital 
markets. The implication of this observation for the sign of the coefficient 1γ  is 
ambiguous. In accordance with the credit view, it is expected that public firms would be 
less severely impacted upon by restrictive monetary policy which would not necessarily 
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curtail the supply of bank credit. This would imply the coefficient 1γ  to be non-negative. 
On the other hand, the relationship lending view contends that it is private firms and not 
public firms that benefit most from building and maintaining long-term banking 
relationships. As a result, during conditions of monetary tightening, public firms diminish 
their demand for bank loans and switch to other forms of finance. In such a case, the 
coefficient 1γ  is expected to be negative. 
The reasoning for the interaction term of the monetary policy indicator with the 
quotation dummy proceeds along similar lines. Quoted firms are invariably subject to 
stringent disclosure requirements which are necessary for being listed on the stock 
exchange. One might therefore expect quoted firms to be less impacted upon after a 
monetary tightening as compared with unquoted firms. Hence, one would expect 
coefficient 2γ  to be positive under the credit view hypothesis and to be negative under the 
relationship lending hypothesis. 
Two issues deserve a mention at this juncture. The first is the choice of the 
monetary policy indicator. The second is the econometric estimation procedure employed 
in the analysis.  
As regards the monetary policy indicator, the focus is on two variables. First, in 
line with the literature in this area, the Bank Rate (BKRT) is employed as an indicator of 
monetary policy (Reddy, 2000). We alternately employ the cash reserve ratio (CRR) as 
an alternative monetary policy indicator. It may be mentioned over the sample period, 
statutory pre-emption in the form of CRR have been significantly lowered from 15 per 
cent at end-March 1992 to 5 per cent at end-March 2002. We also consider the case 
where both policy shocks operate simultaneously. Evidence of such simultaneous change 
in the Bank Rate (price variable) and the CRR (quantity variable) is increasingly 
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evidenced in recent years, wherein the central bank has been found to resort to these twin 
measures in conjunction (RBI, various years).  
Secondly, the analysis focuses primarily on the performance of individual firms. 
As a result, the above model was tested using panel data. However, some of the 
explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous, notably INT. Illustratively, a high debt 
ratio would engender high interest payments. Therefore, standard panel data estimators 
would be inefficient and therefore, an instrumental variable panel data estimator would 
be more appropriate. As a consequence, the two-stage least squares fixed effects 
estimator has been employed (Baltagi, 1995). Accordingly, the explanatory variable INT 
has been instrumented by all other right-hand side variables.  
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for the relevant variables. Several salient 
features that can be gleaned from the table. First, the correlation between debt ratio and 
all its components are positive, except for trade debt, which is, however, quite small in 
absolute terms. Second, trade debt is negatively correlated with overall bank debt as well 
as its short-term component, whereas it is positively related with long-term bank debt. 
This might be indicative of substitution of trade debt with other (particularly, short-term) 
debt. Third, debt and all its components are negatively related to most of the control 
variables; exceptions being tangibles and interest payments. The substitutability aspect of 
trade debt is borne out by the positive relationship with all control variables, except 
interest payments. Likewise, a monetary contraction (proxied by a rise in Bank Rate) 
induces firms to move out of total debt (including its sub-components) and possibly into 
trade debt. 
           [Insert Table 3 about here] 
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The results of the estimation process of equation (7) are presented in Table 4. The 
variables are discussed under four broad heads: control variables, monetary policy 
indicator, ownership dummy and governance dummy.  
As regards the control variables, most of these are highly significant at 
conventional levels and have the expected signs. Thus, higher debt leads to higher 
interest expenses. The coefficient on TAN has the expected positive sign. Exceptions to 
the rule are the coefficients on INTANG, which was found to be positive for DEBT, 
which would suggest limited growth opportunities for firms with high intangibles. Also, 
SIZE was found to have a positive relationship with most debt types, except for total 
debt, bank debt as well as short-term bank debt, where the influence was found to be 
opposite. This would suggest that small-size firms make more use of these debt types. In 
the case of depreciation, the expected negative coefficients were observed; earnings, 
however, did not seem to have any influence on firm’s capital structure.6  
The main focus is on the effects of monetary policy and hence, on the 
coefficients of MPI and its interaction with the governance characteristics dummy 
variables, PUBLIC and QUOTED. From the estimated coefficients of MPI, it can be 
concluded that the signs of the coefficients of MPI are significant and negative in most 
equations, except for trade debt, wherein there is an observed positive relationship. 
Hence, a significant decrease in firms’ debt ratios occurs after monetary policy 
tightening, particularly for total debt, bank debt and short-term debt. In contrast, for trade 
                                                 
6We considered an alternate case wherein the natural logarithm of sales (instead of SIZE) 
was employed as the control variable (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999). The results were 
materially unaltered in that case. We also introduced a control for AGE, where AGE was 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the incorporation of the 
firm. Majumdar (1997) had observed that in the Indian context, SIZE and AGE are key 
organizational determinants of firm performance. In the regression analysis, the variable 
AGE consistently turned out to be insignificant at conventional levels, and hence, was not 
included in subsequent regressions. 
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debt, it seems that when short-term interest rate is raised, firms rearrange their debt 
profile towards trade debt. 
 The positive coefficient on the interaction term MPI*PUBLIC in the equations 
for bank debt and long-term bank debt would indicate that the negative monetary policy 
impact is smaller for public firms than for private firms. As for total debt and trade debt, 
this finding could be interpreted as evidence in support of the relationship lending view.  
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
Finally, the coefficients on the cross-term MPI*QUOTED is positive and 
significant in most equations, while it is negative and significant with respect to long-
term loans. This would suggest that after a monetary contraction, listed firms adjust their 
debt levels away from long-term bank loans and more towards short-term debt, which 
implies that their overall capital structure is more geared towards bank debt (note that the 
sum of long-term and short-term bank debt equals total bank debt).  
 The analysis was subsequently repeated with an alternate variant of monetary 
policy, viz., cash reserve ratio (Table 5). The general picture which emerges with respect 
to this monetary policy indicator is that there is a significant decrease in firms’ debt ratios 
occurs after monetary policy tightening, particularly for total debt, bank debt and short-
term debt. Trade debt is consistently observed to have a positive relationship with MPI 
suggesting that a monetary contraction forces firms to rearrange their debt profile in 
favour of trade debt. 
 The same findings are obtained in case of the interaction terms as well. Thus, a 
monetary contraction has a positive effect on bank debt and long-term bank debt, 
indicating that the negative monetary policy impact is smaller for public firms than for 
private firms when these two debt forms are considered. The negative coefficient on the 
trade debt equation provides strong support for the relationship lending view. Likewise, a 
monetary contraction engenders a shift away from long-term bank debt and towards 
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short-term bank debt, with an overall increase in bank debt and overall debt for listed 
firms. This is evidenced from the fact that the signs of the coefficients are materially 
unaltered with some alterations in their magnitudes in some instances.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The paper addresses the response of the financing behaviour of firms to changes 
in monetary policy employing firm-level data on Indian firms in manufacturing and 
services. The primary focus of the paper is on the differential responses of public versus 
private firms, quoted versus non-quoted firms and manufacturing versus services firms. 
The sample comprises of these types of firms for the period 1992 to 2002.  
 The main findings of the study can be stated as follows:  
First, a significant decrease in firms’ debt ratios occurs after a monetary 
tightening. This is particularly the case for total debt, bank debt and short-term debt. In 
contrast, for trade debt, there was an observed increase in the debt ratio. Therefore, it 
seems that when short-term interest rates are raised, firms reshuffle their debt maturity 
away from short-term debt and towards trade debt. 
Second, a split of the sample into smaller and larger firms indicates that the 
negative monetary policy effect on short-term bank debt is significantly higher for public 
firms as compared with private firms, which can be interpreted as evidence in support of 
the relationship lending view.  
Third, another split of the sample into low and high-leveraged firms suggests that 
both categories of firms exhibit relationship lending, although the observed effect is 
stronger for low-leveraged firms. Further the results indicate that quotation does not 
significant impact the debt profile of most firms.  
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Finally, manufacturing firms are found to be relatively more responsive to 
monetary shock than services firms. In effect, manufacturing firms lower their short-term 
bank borrowings in favour of long-term borrowings in response to a monetary tightening 
vis-à-vis services firms.  
These findings have important implications for policy. At the micro-theoretic 
level, this implies that the real effects of a monetary shock differs markedly among public 
versus private firms, quoted versus unquoted firms as well as manufacturing versus 
services companies. This indicates that policy authorities need to take into account not 
only the differential ownership characteristics and the corporate governance features of 
the firm, but also the nature of economic activity that the firm pursues. Since 
manufacturing firms tend to be more interest sensitive than those in services, a monetary 
policy shock impinges much more on the former vis-à-vis the latter. From the macro 
standpoint, economists have long debated the relative merits and de-merits of bank-based 
versus market-based systems (Van Damme, 1994). While the comparative advantages of 
one vis-à-vis the other are as yet unresolved (Levine, 2002), recent research has observed 
that industries that are heavy users of external capital grow faster in countries with higher 
overall levels of financial development. In other words, merely whether a system is bank-
based or market-based does not bear any relationship with the efficiency of capital 
allocation. This would suggest that as countries achieve higher levels of financial 
development and rely more on external finance, it is important that policy makers remove 
the constraints on intermediation rather than tilt the playing field in favour of banks or 
markets. 
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Table 1: Break-up of Sample Firms by Ownership and Industry Type, 1992-2002 (numbers) 
Firm type Public Private Total 
  Of which
Listed
Of which
Listed
 Of which
Listed
Manufacturing 83 36 884 557 967 593
Services 29 12 100 87 129 99
Total 112 48 994 644 1096 692
Source: Compiled from Prowess database 
 
Table 2: External Financing Pattern by Governance Type:  
Aggregate Averages for 1992-2002  (per cent to respective total) 
 Public
Of which 
Quoted Private
Of which  
Quoted 
Paid-up Capital 10.02 10.00 31.46 40.57 
Long-term debt 8.09 8.11 5.22 1.87 
Short-term debt 52.33 52.44 13.13 6.87 
   Of which  
   Working Capital 10.61 10.50 24.42 21.03 
   Other Current Liabilities 9.35 9.34 23.86 29.66 
   Trade Credit 9.60 9.62 1.92 0.00 
Memo  
Bank Debt 60.43 60.55 18.35 8.75 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix Among the Variables 
Variable DEBT   BANK LTBANK STBANK TRADE 
DEBT 1.000     
BANK 0.298 1.000    
LTBANK 0.152 0.778 1.000   
STBANK 0.295 0.681 0.069 1.000  
TRADE -0.026 -0.010 0.082 -0.111 1.000 
INT 0.479 0.681 0.706 0.259 -0.037 
TAN 0.205 0.089 0.049 0.085 0.008 
INTANG -0.008 -0.011 -0.002 -0.015 0.004 
SIZE -0.120 -0.161 -0.042 -0.207 0.056 
DEPCN -0.013 -0.040 -0.008 -0.054 0.005 
EARN -0.041 -0.057 -0.016 -0.072 0.009 
MPI -0.042 -0.037 -0.027 -0.026 0.036 
MPI is proxied by Bank Rate. 
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Table 4: 2SLS Within Sample Estimation for the Whole Sample 
Variables DEBTit BANKit LTBANKit STBANKit TRADEit
Control Variables      
INTit 1.333 (0.00) 0.301 (0.00) 0.294 (0.00) 0.007 (0.21) -0.036 (0.00) 
TANit 0.705 (0.00) 0.093 (0.00) 0.004 (0.49) 0.090 (0.00) 0.010 (0.04) 
INTANGit 0.188 (0.05) 0.0006 (0.97) -0.003 (0.79) 0.003 (0.82) -0.002 (0.85) 
SIZEit -16.476 (0.00) -0.358 (0.02) 1.478 (0.00) -1.836 (0.00) 2.756 (0.00) 
DEPCNit -0.059 (0.01) 0.004 (0.27) 0.002 (0.44) 0.002 (0.56) 0.0002 (0.93) 
EARNit -0.003 (0.68)    -0.0008 (0.47) 0.0004 (0.58) -0.001 (0.24) -0.0007 (0.34) 
Monetary Policy 
Indicator       
MPIt -2.753 (0.00) -0.237 (0.00) 0.066 (0.30) -0.303 (0.00) 0.400 (0.00) 
Ownership 
Dummy       
MPIt*PUBLIC -13.152 (0.00) 0.883 (0.00) 1.037 (0.00) -0.155 (0.39) -0.428 (0.00) 
Governance 
Dummy      
MPIt*QUOTED 2.668 (0.00) 0.118 (0.29) -0.149 (0.06) 0.267 (0.01) 0.136 (0.08) 
Constant 101.879 (0.00) 11.674 (0.00) -6.652 (0.00) 18.327 (0.00) -16.558 (0.00) 
Diagnotics      
R2 0.080 0.383 0.381 0.028 0.005 
No. of 
Observations 
11555 11555 11555 11555 11555 
No of Firms 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 
p-values in brackets. MPI is proxied by Bank Rate 
 
Table 5: 2SLS Within Sample Estimation for the Whole Sample 
Variables DEBTit BANKit LTBANKit STBANKit TRADEit
ControlVariables      
INTit 1.332 (0.00) 0.300 (0.00) 0.294 (0.00) 0.006 (0.29) -0.035 (0.00) 
TANit 0.694 (0.00) 0.093 (0.00) 0.006 (0.23) 0.086 (0.00) 0.013 (0.01) 
INTANGit 0.184 (0.06) 0.001 (0.93) -0.004 (0.75) 0.005 (0.74) -0.002 (0.86) 
SIZEit -18.035 (0.00) -0.536 (0.09) 1.629 (0.00) -2.166 (0.00) 3.164 (0.00) 
DEPCNit -0.057 (0.02) 0.003 (0.36) 0.002 (0.40) 0.001 (0.73) 0.0004 (0.87) 
EARNit -0.004 (0.59) -0.0008 (0.49) 0.0006 (0.48) -0.001 (0.20) -0.0007 (0.36) 
Monetary Policy 
Indicator      
MPIt -2.202 (0.00) -0.158 (0.02) 0.107 (0.03) -0.265 (0.00) 0.299 (0.00) 
Ownership Dummy      
MPIt*PUBLICt -9.386 (0.00) 0.537 (0.00) 0.840 (0.00) -0.303 (0.02) -0.292 (0.00) 
Governance Dummy      
MPIt*QUOTEDt 1.734 (0.00) 0.016 (0.85) -0.136 (0.02) 0.152 (0.025) 0.194 (0.00) 
Constant 108.749 (0.00) 12.818 (0.00)      -7.959 (0.00) 20.777 (0.00) -18.515 (0.00) 
Diagnostics       
R2 0.102 0.410 0.384 0.035 0.005 
No. of Observations 11555 11555 11555 11555 11555 
No of Firms 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 
p-values in brackets. MPI is proxied by cash reserve ratio (CRR) 
